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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two years, a peace process has been initiated in Northern Ireland. In 
December 1993, the British and Irish Governments issued a joint (Downing Street) 
declaration offering Sinn Fein a place in negotiations on the future of Northern Ireland if 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) called a permanent end to its campaign of violence. 
This "framework of peace," as it was described, included the assertion that the ultimate 
decision on governing Northern Ireland would be made by the majority of its citizens; the 
Republic of Ireland would, as part of an overall settlement, seek to revise its 
constitutional claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland; and Britain would not block 
the possible reunification of Ireland if it was backed by a majority in the North. The 
Downing Street Declaration, set alongside a flurry of secret discussions which included 
an unpublished peace plan devised by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
and Sinn Fein, acted as the catalyst for the IRA and, in turn, loyalist ceasefires (August 
and October 1994 respectively) and prompted the Frameworks Document published in 
February 1995. The latter outlined the preferences of the British and Irish Governments 
for a future settlement. First, agreement must be secured between parties within Northern 
Ireland (strand 1); second, a North-South relationship agreed to (strand 2); and finally, an 
Anglo-Irish (Britain and the Republic of Ireland) agreement reached (strand 3).  
 
Procedural disputes between the British Government and Sinn Fein have stalled the 
process, and the recent resumption of IRA bombings in London have called its future into 
doubt. Nevertheless, when it resumes as most observers believe it will the political 
challenge will be to find a model in which all parties play a legitimate role in the future 
government of Northern Ireland. Since Direct Rule began in 1972, a series of failed 
initiatives provide evidence of the immense difficulty facing the government in trying to 
juggle the demands of restoring devolution to Northern Ireland, giving constitutional 
guarantees to unionists of their position within the United Kingdom and delivering some 
sort of power sharing arrangements between Catholics and Protestants within an all-
Ireland framework. 1 The lessons of the 1973-74 power sharing executive, the 1975 
constitutional convention, 1980 talks-about-talks, 1982 rolling devolution and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, Brooke/Mayhew inter-party 
talks, the Hume/Adams peace plan, the 1993 Joint Declaration and finally the rejection of 
the 1995 Frameworks Documents by unionists does not bode well for an easy transition 
to an acceptable form of governance. Yet this is where the real challenge lies. Without 
some long-term progress toward a stable political system the men of violence will, as 
they have in the past, reoccupy the constitutional vacuum. The IRA has not disbanded nor 
scaled down its operations and has not ceased planning terrorist attacks to be carried out 
if the ceasefire ends. It is still involved in racketeering, intelligence gathering and 
punishment attacks.  
 
Since the demise of the ill-fated Northern Ireland Assembly, 2 which was boycotted by 
the SDLP and Sinn Fein, the only platform shared by all the political parties (including 
Sinn Fein) has been local government. From 1988 onwards, open reference was being 
made to "responsibility sharing" on councils, a term attributed to Ken Maginnis (MP for 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone), in deference to unionist sensitivities over "power 
sharing." These sensitivities stemmed from the collapse of the short-lived power sharing 
executive in 1974, brought down by the Protestant Ulster Workers' Council general 
strike. At present almost half of the 26 local councils share responsibility, including some 
with an infamous reputation for sectarian practices. The aims of this article are threefold. 
First, drawing on research from "hung" councils in Great Britain, we assess the extent to 
which responsibility sharing in Northern Ireland can be seen as a stable form of 
government. Second, we chart the experiences and reactions of the main political parties 
to responsibility sharing in councils. Finally, we explore whether there are any lessons to 
be learned from the local government experience which would prove helpful in the 
formation of some power sharing mechanism at the national level.  
 
BACKGROUND  
 
It is perhaps ironic that local government in Northern Ireland has now become the focus 
of research in power sharing, since its creation in the present format owed much to its 
abuse of power through gerrymandering, the allocation of public housing and 
employment discrimination. It is even more ironic that the forum against which the civil 
rights movement in 1968 directed most of their criticisms and eventually led to the start 
of "the troubles," is now offered as a model from which lessons can be learned. 3  
 
The existing local government system in Northern Ireland was established following the 
Local Government (NI) Act (1972). Under this Act 26 local government districts have 
three basic roles an executive role, a representative role and a consultative role. Their 
executive role involves the provision of a limited range of services, such as 
environmental health, cleansing, recreation and latterly economic development. Services, 
such as housing, education, roads and personal social services, are the responsibility of 
either government departments, public agencies or area boards. The councils' 
representative role involves nominating local councillors to sit as members of the various 
statutory boards. They are consulted by government department officials on the operation 
of regional services in their area. Their relatively minor role is illustrated by a current 
estimated net expenditure budget of £192m from a total public expenditure purse of £8 
billion. 4 Yet local authorities are important, apart from the executive functions they 
undertake.  
 
Firstly, as the only democratically elected forum in Northern Ireland since the demise of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1986, they are of symbolic significance. Secondly, in 
the absence of any devolved government, councillors are the most accessible source for 
constituents with concerns about education, health, housing and other mainstream 
services, over which local government has no direct control. Thirdly, councils employ 
about 9,000 people in an economy which is noted for its high level of unemployment 
(14.2 percent). 5  
 
Given the lack of any other constitutional platform, local councillors indulge in political 
debate and occasional skirmishes which have little to do with their executive functions. 
Acrimony heightened in 1985 when Sinn Fein councillors were elected to local 
authorities and the situation deteriorated further following the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 
November of the same year. Unionist-controlled councils became the vehicle for protests 
against the Agreement which included suspending council business and, in some cases, 
refusing to strike a district rate. After a sustained campaign of opposition, unionist 
councils drifted back to normal business due, inter alia, to concerns that their refusal to 
meet with government ministers had the potential to delay social and economic progress 
in their areas.  
 
The local government elections of 1989 marked a turning point in council chambers with 
a degree of moderation not unrelated to the decline in representation from the political 
extremes. Dungannon District Council is credited with leading the way through an 
experiment in responsibility sharing. In May 1988, the council established a special 
committee which passed a resolution recognizing "responsibility sharing as an important 
step which might help us to develop trust in the community." The motion was initiated by 
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), SDLP, and Independent Nationalists. It was agreed that 
the position of the chair would be rotated, on a six monthly basis, between council 
members "who deplore violence and seek to pursue political progress by political 
means." This effectively excluded Sinn Fein from responsibility sharing and the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) refused to partake. While unionists and nationalists 
were equal in terms of council seats (11-11), in practice, unionists controlled the local 
authority through the casting vote of the chair. The rotation of chairmanship, in effect, 
transferred power between the two respective blocs. Considering the fury of unionists at 
wider political developments in the province, Dungannon's decision to rotate the chair 
has to be viewed as a major step forward in relations at the local level between unionists 
and nationalists. The Enniskillen bombing of November 1987 appears to have had a 
profound impact upon local politicians in Dungannon. Beirne, for example, noted:  
Many councillors . . . felt the need to bring an end to sterile adversarial politics in a 
common commitment to economic and general well-being of the area, and they found in 
their opposition to political violence more in common than they had previously 
recognised. 6  
 
 
Other councils followed suit in the wake of the 1989 local government elections. Eleven 
local authorities appointed mayors/chairmen and deputies from both political traditions. 
In 1989, the central government also launched a new community relations initiative 
within local councils whereby 75 percent grant-aid was made available to councils which 
agreed on a cross -party basis to participate in schemes (sports, arts and cultural, 
educational) aimed at bringing the two communities together. A spirit of co-operation 
emerged in some councils galvanized by their unanimous opposition to the imposition of 
compulsory competitive tendering. The power sharing trend continued following the 
1993 local government elections with 12 councils now participating and an upbeat mood 
on prospects for its longevity. As one observer commented after the elections:  
There may be some cause for hope in Ulster's new councils. The UUP, Alliance and the 
SDLP have expressed varying degrees of enthusiasm for 'partnership,' code word for 
sharing the main positions of authority, and the British Government has hinted that such 
arrangements may be rewarded with increased powers to local government. There are 
several local councils where a combination of these three parties can form the critical 
mass necessary to take control and to blur the orange/green divide. A growth in power 
sharing would do a great deal to change the mood music of Ulster politics and to build 
the trust between parties which is the necessary precursor to a larger political 
accommodation. 7  
There have been calls recently both for greater devolution of power to local government 
and a new form of regional government. In the former case, the argument is that a gradual 
return of local government functions could be conditional on councils adopting power 
sharing. 8 In the latter, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, former head of the Northern Ireland civil 
service, suggested a review in the form of Macrory II (Patrick Macrory provided the 
blueprint for the first reorganization). 9 Both alternatives envisage a greater role for local 
government but acknowledge that effective safeguards must exist to guard against abuses 
of power and allay the fears of nationalists, eloquently expressed by Alban Maginness 
(SDLP councillor, Belfast City Council): "Giving some councils restored powers would 
be like inviting Erich Honeker back to implement the reform programme in East 
Germany. " 10  
 
Archbishop Eames, Church of Ireland Primate, on the other hand, in his submission to the 
Opsahl Commission (a forum established in February 1993 to elicit community views on 
the way ahead) argued for more power to be given to local councils where there was 
evidence of a sharing of responsibility. This, in his view, would be part of a more 
systematic progression which entailed "slow, steady progress in building up inter -
community confidence and trust." 11  
 
THE "HUNG" COUNCIL FRAMEWORK  
 
The STV proportional representation system of voting operates at the local council level 
in Northern Ireland and was introduced in 1973 as a reaction to unionist hegemony from 
1920, and a recognition of a multi-party system which could be more adequately 
represented, nationalist minorities in particular. The system clearly had an impact on the 
composition of local authorities and few majority councils exist where one political party 
holds the overall majority of seats. Following the 1993 elections (see Appendix 1), for 
example, only 5 of the 26 councils were majority councils. 12 Technically, therefore, the 
remaining 21 councils could be described as "hung" councils, where "no single party 
holds a majority of council seats but in which the majority of councillors belong to 
political parties." 13 A body of research has now emerged on the experiences of hung 
councils in Great Britain, most notably on their politics and management, organizational 
behavior 14 and the dynamics of coalitions. 15 This is hardly surprising since about 30 
percent of councils in Great Britain are now hung. 16  
 
Some debate exists about the usefulness of theoretical frameworks in examining hung 
councils, in particular about the contribution of coalition theory to an understanding of 
these authorities. Leach and Stewart see the coalition framework as inappropriate for 
local government because the approach is selective and pays too little attention to "the 
study of the whole organizational and political behaviour" in hung councils. 17 Temple 
also argues that a multi-dimensional coalition approach, pioneered by Pridham, "may be 
optimistic given the sheer range of relevant contextual variables cited" as being important 
in coalition formation. 18 He makes a similar, but qualified, criticism of a framework 
devised by Leach and Stewart to explain the behavioral outcomes in hung councils. The 
qualification is that it "provides future case studies . . . with a useful paradigm" in the 
study of hung councils. We propose firstly to describe and then utilize the Leach and 
Stewart framework as a means of examining the stability of hung councils in Northern 
Ireland and from that, draw some lessons on the future of power sharing at the macro 
level. Aside from the theoretical discussions about the appropriateness of conceptual 
frameworks there is a general consensus about the merits of hung councils, best described 
by Temple:  
Hung councils work, and provide some measure of proof that British politicians with 
contrasting philosophies can work together to resolve difficult political issues. 19
The implications of "working together" in Northern Ireland are even more significant.  
 
Leach and Stewart 20 classify hung councils into four broad categories. 21 First is the 
formal coalition where two or more parties agree to form a joint administration and to 
share out chairs and vice chairs on the basis of some form of explicit working 
arrangement. They may also agree on shared policies but this is not seen as a necessity. 
This type of hung council is the least popular category, totalling some 7.5 percent in the 
latest survey. 22  
 
Second is power sharing, where two or more parties agree to share chairs, without any 
commitment to shared policy objectives or a program. The difference between power 
sharing councils and coalitions is that the politicians involved in the former wish to be 
seen as politically distinct. This is the most popular form of hung council with some 37.5 
percent falling into this category. A total of 45 percent of hung councils have, therefore, 
some form of coalition government. 23  
 
Third is the minority administration, another popular choice in which one party is 
allowed to form an administration with the explicit or implicit support of the other party 
or parties. Support can vary from a coalition in policy terms but without sharing chairs 
and vice-chairs, to an initial agreement enabling one party to form an administration, but 
with no commitment to any regular endorsement. This ranked as the second most popular 
form of hung council at 33.8 percent. 24  
 
The final category is no administration, a system where temporary chairs rotate among 
different parties with no expectation of office duration. Chairs may be rotated, ad hoc, 
meeting-by-meeting or on some rota basis. This type of hung council ranked third most 
popular with 21.2 percent. 25 Such a formulation, however, requires adaptation for hung 
councils in Northern Ireland. Although 21 councils can be described as hung, there are 
obvious political coalitions that form, based on either the unionist or nationalist 
cleavages. Those hung councils where there is a combined UUP -DUP majority, for 
example, are described as unionist controlled councils and those with a combined SDLP-
Sinn Fein majority as nationalist controlled councils. Where unionists or nationalists do 
not form the largest single grouping these are described as no-majority councils, perhaps 
a strange use of the term since, by definition, all hung councils have no majority. Hence 
the option for a political party such as the UUP, with the largest number of seats (but not 
a majority), is to form an explicit or implicit agreement with the DUP (intra-unionist 
cleavage) or to power share with nationalists, usually the SDLP (mixed cleavage). 
Conversely, the SDLP as the largest party may adopt Sinn Fein as partners or power 
share with unionists, normally the UUP. The 21 hung councils in Northern Ireland can 
thus be classified as follows:  
 
Table 1
What is of particular interest here, of course, is the power sharing cohort where the 
largest party numerically eschews the natural political cleavage and shares power with a 
party representing a different religious tradition. This group contains not only 4 
nationalist, 3 unionist and 2 mixed councils (highlighted in Table 1) but a further 2 SDLP 
and 1 UUP majority councils who have opted to share power or adopt hung council 
characteristics a total of 12 out of 26 councils. Power sharing would normally entail the 
rotation of the chair/vice chair positions and committee chairs, proportionate distribution 
of committee members and sharing of representation on external public bodies. 26 Power 
sharing councils, including the partners involved, are listed in Table 2 for the period 
1993-95.  
 
Table 2
The experiences of how stable mixed cleavage power sharing councils are, clearly has 
broader implications for a government desperately trying to establish a model of political 
co-operation in Northern Ireland. Research in Great Britain suggests there are five key 
conditions necessary for stability in hung councils. 28  
 
Firstly, political history and culture are seen as important in that if the ideological gap 
between the sharing parties is narrow, chances of a successful partnership are high. 
Relationships within political parties must also be stable and cohesive to sustain the 
partnership. Internal divisions will ultimately impact upon inter-party working 
relationships. Secondly, temporal factors are important. If hung councils are seen as long-
lasting the duration of the council term, for example then stability is more likely. Thirdly, 
if each of the major parties has a significant proportion of seats then stable inter-party 
relations will result, hence numbers of seats matter. Fourthly, the chief executive is seen 
as playing a crucial role, acting as honest broker in stable situations, whereas he/she may 
not be trusted by one or more of the parties in unstable alliances. Finally, the geography 
of councils is deemed important. Rural or semi-rural councils do not occasion the 
political controversies of urban councils, making the former grouping more likely to be 
stable.  
POWER SHARING IN NORTHERN IRELAND  
 
Do power sharing councils in Northern Ireland therefore represent a stable form of 
government and provide an exemplar for co-operation province-wide? In other words, 
can local government be seen as a microcosm of some future political arrangement at the 
national level? To address this question we draw on the Leach and Stewart paradigm 
outlined. Research was undertaken in 15 councils in Northern Ireland, the 12 power 
sharing councils (listed in Table 2: 1993/94) and 3 non-sharing councils (Lisburn, 
Cookstown and Craigavon). The research involved three stages: documentary research of 
council minutes and local newspaper reports on council meetings since the 
commencement of power sharing; in-depth semi -structured interviews, totalling 50, with 
leaders of each political group in the 15 councils; and non-participant observation of 
monthly council meetings in each of the councils over a 6 month period (November 
1993-June 1994).  
 
To explore the history and culture of hung councils, we examine the experiences of 
power sharing partners and the reaction of those parties excluded, based upon data from 
the three stage research process outlined. 29  
 
THE NATIONALIST RESPONSE 
 
The SDLP  
 
The SDLP have engaged in what they prefer to call "partnership" government since the 
reorganization of local government in 1973, although the practice was not firmly 
established. The SDLP in Down Council, for example, have rotated offices with unionists 
since that time. Policy directives emerged from the SDLP as early as 1980 that sought to 
promote "partnership" government as a means of lessening community tensions:  
Partnership arrangements in these councils (they identify Derry, Down and Newry & 
Mourne) have led to a dramatic effect on the community in which they are situated. 
These communities are now well known for their sense of tolerance and understanding of 
the other person's viewpoint. 30
The SDLP's 1993 local government elections' manifesto ("Progress through Partnership") 
highlighted the rewards of "partnership" government by specifically comparing the two 
major urban centres in Northern Ireland, Belfast and Derry. For the SDLP, Derry 
represents an ideal model of partnership government:  
Derry City Council is able to project a positive constructive image to the outside world, 
so that working with its MP/MEP, Derry is able to attract investment, create jobs, 
develop tourism and market itself as one of Ireland's premier cities. Belfast City Council 
on the other hand, has become the by-word for sectarian, obstructionist politics of a kind 
that most of us, of whatever political persuasion, hoped we had seen the last of twenty 
years ago. To put it mildly, Belfast's ruling fathers do not succeed or attempt to promote 
the city as a modern, dynamic and responsible centre for industrial or social development. 
31
The SDLP believe that power sharing automatically improves both the day-to-day 
working and broader political relationships within councils. The sharing of the top office 
is, in itself, a political gesture which indicates a level of respect for both communities. 
They do not believe that rotating the chairmanship in councils where they have a majority 
is any less significant than office sharing in a hung council:  
We can't help people voting for us and simply because unionists are in the minority that 
does not mean that we have to deny ourselves majority rights. We do, however, eschew 
majority rights that unionists claim elsewhere, often at a cost to ourselves. 32
Responsibility sharing, according to the SDLP, enhances democracy because the majority 
of people within the wider community support it. In particular, power sharing in a 
majority council indicates that the largest party are not set on outright domination. The 
SDLP argue that non-sharing unionist councils are covetous by virtue of their failure to 
share the top titles. As one party member put it:  
Power sharing allows for the embodiment of two traditions. It does not mean that 
political parties have to relinquish their traditions as it allows for the cherishing of those 
positions and nobody should feel threatened by it because one of the central tenets of our 
party's policy is that we don't want ascendancy. 33  
Since the SDLP's likely power sharing partner is the UUP, one possible consequence is 
the effective marginalization of Sinn Fein. The SDLP, however, are only too aware that 
unionists will not engage in responsibility sharing if it involves active liaison with Sinn 
Fein. In this sense, it is the unionists who present the SDLP with the choice of co-
operation or confrontation rather than the SDLP actively marginalizing Sinn Fein. 
Although, at the higher political level, the joint contribution of John Hume and Gerry 
Adams to the peace process is now well-known, this partnership does not appear to have 
been easily replicated at the local level. Similarly, there is fierce local intra-unionist 
rivalry, most notably over the DUP reaction to the Joint Declaration and the ceasefire 
announcements.  
 
Sinn Fein  
Across the province Sinn Fein and Independent Nationalists councillors have registered 
their disapproval at the SDLP's stance on power sharing. Their disapproval does not 
appear to stem from opposition to responsibility sharing per se but rather to the way in 
which it excludes them from council business. At a practical level, Sinn Fein councillors 
have challenged the sincerity of responsibility sharing by nominating candidates for the 
top positions, or by endorsing Independents. Sinn Fein's 1993 election successes have 
placed enormous pressure on the SDLP's ability to act freely in at least 4 councils 
(Magherafelt, Newry & Mourne, Omagh and Dungannon).  
 
Sinn Fein are equivocal about power sharing. Some Sinn Fein members see it as useful, 
others as a farce. The former are Sinn Fein members who have benefitted from 
proportionality on council committees (Newry & Mourne and Magherafelt), the latter are 
those who have been excluded or under-represented on committees (Dungannon and 
Fermanagh). One consequence of the SDLP/UUP "pact" is that both these parties, to 
prove their sincerity and commitment to the partnership, indulge in a more obdurate 
approach to Sinn Fein and the DUP respectively. Sinn Fein members, at the receiving end 
of attempts to marginalize them, see this as a clever SDLP ploy to outflank them 
electorally under the guise of mainstream consensus politics with unionists, an idea with 
mass appeal to voters frustrated and disillusioned by the vitriol synonymous with some 
council chambers.  
 
THE UNIONIST RESPONSE  
 
UUP  
 
The Ulster Unionists' stance on responsibility sharing is best described by the party 
leader, James Molyneaux, who endorsed what he called "the sensible policy of 
cooperation" though he added "it is not power sharing or anything like it." The party are 
keen to promote the practice of proportionality on committees among constitutional 
parties. The UUP are wary of playing into the hands of the DUP, given the failure of the 
power sharing executive in 1974. Responsibility sharing is perceived by unionists as a 
practice initiated by the SDLP for their own political purposes and as such they are 
cautious about "making the SDLP look good." On the one hand, unionists see 
responsibility sharing as no more than the enactment of democracy; yet it becomes 
undemocratic when it is being foisted upon non -complying parties or when the 
government attempt to force partnership by promising economic rewards to councils who 
are willing to share power.  
We hold true to democracy and if in the council chamber you are democratic that's no 
problem. If you operate proportionality on committees that's fine. We have no problem 
with that either, but let's not start calling it something else like power sharing or 
responsibility sharing for it is just pure democracy. 34  
I wouldn't want to put a particular tag on it . . . there is a limited amount of power in 
being a councillor and one could talk about all sorts of fancy titles, power sharing, 
responsibility sharing, but I would say it is just a common sense approach to the every 
day workings of a sensible council.35
A lively debate is taking place within the UUP on the issue of power sharing. Those on 
the right of the party opposed it on the basis that it was undemocratic and that the 
government was surreptitiously setting this agenda. The basis of the undemocratic charge 
rests upon viewing democracy as the rule of the majority. The party with the largest 
number of seats should be allowed to form a majority unimpeded by unofficial promises 
of government economic grant-aid if the councils share power. Yet unionists on the left 
of the party believed that there was more to be gained from "playing the game" or putting 
on "the cloak of respectability" if only to obtain these rewards. As one unionist councillor 
remarked:  
I wish other unionists would have the sense to play the game because we are essentially 
playing the game in Newry and Mourne and to the best of our belief we haven't been 
caught at it, certainly we haven't been caught by the electorate. We are in a position 
where we are in the minority on the council, and having taken a conscious decision to 
represent our people to the best of our ability, then we have to be part of that. In other 
words, we have to get mud on our boots and mud on our hands and say people are 
wonderful, but it is simply to achieve the goal that our people are not being left behind 
and we have been lucky because we haven't been caught . . . some people misunderstand 
that. 36
Given the differences that exist within the UUP on power sharing at the local level, it is 
not surprising that Ulster Unionist Headquarters has not adopted a definitive policy. The 
UUP gave each council a licence to adopt whatever form of administration it deemed 
appropriate. The result is a pattern of inconsistency throughout the province as UUP 
councillors tussle over whether or not nationalists should be given chairmanships:  
We had talks with the leadership before we endorsed this policy (responsibility sharing) 
and we were told that because each council is so different in make-up there is no simple 
policy that can cover all districts. 37
The national party have tried to impose a definitive policy on power sharing but have 
found that because of certain strong political personalities it has caused splits in the party. 
The policy now is to do whatever council members feel fit to do. 38
Party leader Jim Molyneaux believes that mandated power sharing is unworkable because 
it would "render elections null and void, unnecessary and redundant," giving credibility 
to exponents of undemocratic methods. Voluntary power sharing, however, was another 
matter:  
It would take account of election results and (we could) then see what collection of 
parties could be brought together in a coalition. It would be something voluntarily done 
by all parties in consultation.  
 
It wouldn't be power sharing laid down by statute, saying in advance of elections no 
matter what the results of those elections, that you weren't going to alter a predetermined 
proportionality. 39
DUP  
 
The DUP are unequivocal in their response to power sharing. Their 1993 election 
manifesto condemned the "blackmail" attempts by the Northern Ireland Office to force 
unionists into power sharing agreements with "republicans" on councils. 40 Evidence of 
the surreptitious hand of government subtly coercing unionists to comply with a power 
sharing agenda is provided by a DUP councillor in Omagh:  
The SDLP/UUP pact in Omagh has been a cosy disaster. Three examples spring to mind. 
Firstly, the UUP in Omagh actively colluded with the Northern Ireland Office to move 
the hospital maternity unit away from the area. Ken Maginnis (UUP, MP for Fermanagh 
and South Tyrone) had said that if the maternity service didn't go to Enniskillen then he 
would lose his seat to Nationalists. The Northern Ireland Office deliberately influenced 
the decision of where to maintain a maternity service to placate their men, and that is well 
recorded. Secondly, we had the Housing Executive offices taken away from Omagh and 
located in Derry as a result of John Hume. Instead of campaigning to keep jobs in 
Omagh, the SDLP decided not to go against their party leader and, of course, the UUP 
were dragged into supporting that. Thirdly, an economic strategy to promote jobs in the 
area has been drawn up with my assistance, but it has not been looked at because it 
doesn't suit the coalition. My plans involve the active participation of all councillors and 
our MP (DUP, William McCrea). They cannot abide that, and certainly will not invite 
McCrea in here. Responsibility sharing between the SDLP and the UUP is a contrived 
form of bigotry against other parties. 41
DUP Alderman Sammy Wilson said that it was a great pity the UUP were "aiding and 
abetting the dirty tricks of the Northern Ireland Office by participating in responsibility 
sharing." 42 The party are implacably opposed to responsibility sharing in any form. They 
see it as undemocratic and an SDLP-driven public relations initiative that is no more than 
window dressing. Party members are highly critical of UUP members who "collaborate" 
in a "cosy relationship" with the SDLP. DUP councillors frequently attempt to expose the 
fragility of UUP members' commitment to power sharing within councils (Magherafelt 
and Dungannon are examples) and their reluctance to publicize the idea to the traditional 
Ulster Unionist electorate. As one DUP councillor put it:  
People see it as a joke, it has been dressed up to such a degree that people see it for what 
it is, a public relations exercise between the SDLP and UUP in which they orchestrate to 
keep us off committees, which is farcical when you consider that it's supposed to be 
about sharing. The UUP have never explained why they engage in responsibility sharing 
nor have they ever fought an election on it. If you look at their propaganda there is no 
mention of it. It's an embarrassment to them as they go around the doors. I am not sure 
they want people to know. The SDLP do try to promote it but the UUP certainly do not. 
If you spoke to them privately they would say they have little confidence in it. Maginnis 
(MP, Fermanagh and South Tyrone and one time councillor in Dungannon) steam-rolled 
them into it and now they can't get out. 43  
Power sharing councils are not a bastion of political tranquillity and co-operation. 
Controversy has flared up over issues which create fundamental divisions between the 
parties. During 1992-93, for example, the SDLP elected DUP Councillor William Hay as 
mayor of Derry City Council. During his tenure, Hay refused to meet with both the Irish 
President, Mary Robinson, and the then Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds. The SDLP claimed 
Hay as mayor had failed in his duties to represent the wishes of the majority in Derry. 
Divisions also emerged in Newry and Mourne when the council proposed a motion 
condemning road traffic delays caused by army checkpoints in South Armagh (locally 
referred to as "bandit country"). Despite a policy of co-operation, unionists could not 
support such a motion. In the same council area, however, all political parties, except 
Sinn Fein, condemned the bombing of a local hotel (the Mourne County) by the IRA and 
the killing of a British soldier. Power sharing has also been used by councils to promote a 
positive image of their areas. Dungannon Council, for example, claimed that a decision 
by Carmen Electronics, a Korean company, to set up a factory in their area was 
influenced by the partnership arrangements of the council. This was endorsed by the then 
Economy Minister, Robert Atkins, who in announcing the decision of Carmen to locate 
in Dungannon said:  
This is an excellent example of how cohesive local involvement can assist economic 
development, as councillors and other community representatives from the area, working 
in partnership with the Industrial Development Board, were an important factor in 
Carmen's decision to come to Dungannon. 44  
In summary, the SDLP view power sharing as both conciliatory and a common sense 
approach to the smooth implementation of council business. The party do not see the 
"success" of power sharing as a precursor to transferring more functions to local 
government, which should only come as part of an overall agreed political settlement at 
the macro level. The UUP are split between moderates and hardliners. There is a clear 
perception held by UUP members, particularly in non-sharing councils, that power 
sharers seem to do better when it comes to securing government funds. Moderates 
contend that since the UUP are the largest party in all the non-sharing councils, forgoing 
the possibility of funds for their areas is too risky. This view is informed by the legacy of 
isolation felt by a number of Ulster Unionist councillors during the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement protest when they refused to meet government ministers and, as a 
consequence, debarred themselves from potential funding sources. Hardliners, on the 
other hand, argue that power sharing is contrary to the principle of majoritarianism in a 
democracy and the SDLP, because of their United Ireland agenda, should not hold high 
office in any form of government whose demise they are dedicated to securing. Such a 
position is particularly prevalent among UUP councillors who are faced with a strong 
DUP presence (Belfast and Ballymena are examples here). Power sharing with 
nationalists of whatever hue is anathema to the DUP. Sinn Fein's position is dictated by 
how well served as a party they are, under specific power sharing arrangements.  
 
Table 3
Aside from history and culture Leach and Stewart highlight the political arithmetic, time, 
the role of the chief executive and the urban/rural dichotomy as influencing stability. In 
terms of political arithmetric, has responsibility sharing encouraged a degree of political 
moderation and stability in local government, reflected in electoral trends? In such 
conditions one might expect to see a decline in support for Sinn Fein and the DUP, and 
cross-party electoral voting (under the PR voting system used at local elections) between 
the SDLP and the UUP in short, the politics of moderation. In the former case there has 
not been a significant decline in support for Sinn Fein or the DUP in local elections since 
1989, the responsibility sharing era. In 1993, Sinn Fein's first preference vote increased 
by 1.3 percent and they gained 8 extra seats (total of 51 councillors). The DUP vote 
decreased only marginally by 0.5 percent with the loss of 7 seats (total of 103 
councillors). These results, however, must be interpreted against an increase in 16 seats 
available (566 to 582) as a result of boundary changes (see Appendix 1).  
 
An analysis of cross-party voting trends (destination of transfers) in the 1993 local 
government elections within the 12 power sharing councils and the remaining 14 
authorities revealed some interesting results. 45 There was a greater propensity to transfer 
votes across the political divide (between SDLP and UUP) in power sharing councils, 
although it was more significant among SDLP voters than UUP voters. There was also a 
greater propensity to transfer votes within the unionist parties (between DUP and UUP) 
in power sharing councils, although it was more significant among DUP than UUP 
voters. Within nationalist parties (Sinn Fein and SDLP), Sinn Fein were more likely to 
transfer votes to the SDLP in power sharing councils. The reverse, however, was true of 
SDLP voters in power sharing councils who were less likely to support Sinn Fein 
candidates. In short, there was a greater proclivity to transfer votes within and between 
the main political blocs in power sharing councils with one exception, SDLP vote 
transfers to Sinn Fein. This general assessment is substantiated by Table 3 where higher 
transfer patterns can be seen in power sharing councils, with the tendency more 
significant from nationalists to unionists.  
 
As with hung councils in Britain, the number of seats is seen as important in shaping the 
power sharing model. In those councils where unionists have a slim hold on the largest 
party title, power sharing has featured prominently on their agenda (e.g. Fermanagh, 
Armagh and Cookstown). Two councillors from different authorities drew attention to the 
political arithmetic and its influence of the UUP's propensity to share power:  
Unionists chose to share power in Armagh (1993-94) but I'm sure they found it quite 
difficult. At the same time they realised that the 'writing was on the wall' in relation to the 
division of seats. In every election for the last 4 terms the SDLP have increased their 
seats by one. But for the fact of intimidation of candidates in this year's elections (1993), 
it would have ended up 11-11. From a population point of view Armagh District Council 
is 50/50 but in relation to seats, we are a seat short of being 50 percent of the council. 46  
The unionists should have regard for the fact that in 1993 the majority of votes cast (in 
Cookstown) were non-unionist votes and it is only by accident that they have a majority 
on the council. I fancy that among some of the UUP there is a real wish to have better 
relations and to do things fairly. Now the fact that they didn't share all down the years 
raises a question mark over whether or not their conversion is complete but I do honestly 
believe that many of them are sincere about achieving better relations, although there 
could be an element of keeping an eye to the future when they know the boot is going to 
be on the other foot. 47
Time is therefore relevant in this context to the extent that within unionist councils, if a 
change in the largest party is foreseeable, they are more likely to share power in the 
short-term. The exception to this, however, is the one majority UUP council which shares 
power (Banbridge). Here the role of the chief executive is seen as pivotal. It is significant 
that in 3 of the unionist councils (Armagh, Banbridge and Cookstown) most proactive in 
promoting an image of co-operation the chief executives are relatively new appointees. 
They are strong advocates of cross party collaboration in the broader interests of the 
council. Councillors within these authorities provided evidence of chief executives 
"knocking heads together" and "behind the scenes moves" in the interests of less fractious 
council chambers.  
 
The rural/urban dichotomy used in the Leach and Stewart framework is slightly 
inappropriate in the Northern Ireland context given the scale of authorities therein. The 
two most obvious urban examples, however, are Derry and Belfast, regarded as models of 
cooperation and conflict respectively. Derry, a SDLP majority council, on the one hand 
has made serious attempts to rotate the chair with unionists, at one point somewhat 
disastrously for the party by having a DUP mayor. Belfast, on the other hand, has 
retained power exclusively among unionists and gained an infamous reputation for 
vitriolic sectarian debates, fuelled by the combined fervor of DUP and Sinn Fein political 
personalities. In this sense the two main urban centres reflect the extremes of political co-
operation, although Derry City Council is not without its critics as both the DUP and 
UUP have now refused to accept the chair and power sharing is retained only by the 
tenuous grip of an independent unionist who has twice been elected mayor. Unionists 
claim power sharing in Derry is a myth:  
Derry City Council has always been portrayed nationally and internationally as a shining 
example of how Nationalists will treat Unionists and, in reality, it is quite different. It is 
not a power sharing council. In all committees and in all meetings there is an SDLP 
majority, so no matter who is chairing the meeting or who is the mayor, the SDLP still 
control that meeting on every vote, and on every issue they operate a strong party whip. If 
Unionists were in power we would probably be doing the exact same thing. 48  
This is completely at odds with SDLP claims of Derry as the exemplar of power sharing 
and a blunt admission that unionists would indulge in the same pretensions. What is clear, 
however, is that the activities of the two largest councils overshadow the efforts of rural 
councils. In short, the machinations of Belfast City Council are synonymous with 
everything that is perceived to be local government in Northern Ireland as a whole, and 
that is normally bad press for rural councils.  
 
Table 4
The application of the Leach and Stewart framework is summarized in Table 4. Three 
points are noteworthy from the application of the framework in Northern Ireland. First, 
Leach and Stewart offer no ranking or weighting in the conditions necessary for stability, 
merely noting that "where all or most of the foregoing conditions are present a settled or 
stable form of hung authority is likely." 49 What is apparent in applying the paradigm to 
Northern Ireland is the overwhelming importance of the ideological position to the 
stability or otherwise of power sharing councils. Those councils with a low DUP 
presence are much more likely to result in stable relationships between the SDLP and 
UUP. Second, and in rank order, narrowly held unionist councils are more likely to share 
power but conditions are unstable and working relationships fraught. Third, the role of 
the chief executive is particularly important in the small local government units of 
Northern Ireland where his (there are no female chief executives in Northern Ireland) 
strength of personal conviction can be instrumental in influencing power sharing 
arrangements. Clearly, not all the factors promoting stability are evident in Northern 
Ireland's councils but, on balance, there are encouraging signs of political co-operation 
which hitherto would have been unheard of.  
 
CONCLUSION: A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE ?  
 
What can be said firstly, about extending power sharing within local government and 
secondly, its prospects for transfer as a stable form of government at the macro political 
level? Three observations can be made on the prospects for extending power sharing in 
councils. First, in the six nationalist controlled councils (Derry, Down, Limavady, 
Magherafelt, Newry & Mourne and Omagh) power sharing will continue by virtue of the 
SDLP's commitment to it as a party policy. Second, in the two councils with no overall 
majority (Dungannon and Moyle), which rotate the chair, responsibility sharing may be 
no more than a matter of political expediency where parties seek alliances, making a 
virtue out of necessity. Finally, four unionist controlled councils shared power in 1993-94 
(Armagh, Ballymoney, Banbridge and Fermanagh). Following the June 1994 annual 
general meetings this changed to Banbridge, Cookstown, Craigavon and Fermanagh for 
the year 1994-95. In the 1993-94 grouping Ballymoney can be explained as an aberration 
(disagreement between the DUP and UUP), Armagh and Fermanagh as two councils 
narrowly held by unionists and Banbridge as the only example where there is a clear 
unionist majority and power sharing.  
 
In the 1994-95 grouping, the disappearance of Ballymoney is no real surprise. The 
absence of Armagh and the emergence of Cookstown (another marginal unionist council) 
in the group does, however, validate SDLP claims that where the balance of power is 
finely tipped in favor of unionists, they are more willing to share power. Banbridge and 
Craigavon cannot, however, be explained in this way. Both have strong unionist 
majorities, and in Craigavon's case has been associated with the most blatant examples of 
sectarianism. 50 Does this, therefore, represent a bold initiative by the UUP in these 
councils and signal a change in attitudes among UUP members province-wide?  
As one UUP councillor (Banbridge) put it:  
Things are now blowing towards partnership but it will be a long haul . . . leadership is 
needed and, to date, no council has given the lead in this yet. We are going to give a 
substantial lead when we appoint an SDLP chairman and, when we do, I think you will 
see a lot more councils follow suit. 51  
This is an accurate assessment of the prospects with one caveat. Craigavon's power 
sharing, given its infamous reputation, is a symbolically important council to "follow 
suit" and is indicative of the much better relationships developing between the UUP and 
SDLP in local government. The prospect of seeing a "lot more councils" follow suit, 
however, must be seen as an optimistic assessment. More encouraging indicators of a 
comprehensive commitment to power sharing in unionist councils would entail (in no 
particular order):  
• an SDLP mayor in Craigavon, to maintain the bold momentum toward power 
sharing in such a bastion of unionism and provide leadership to reluctant sharers;  
• a consistent UUP/SDLP rotation policy in the finely balanced unionist councils 
(Armagh, Fermanagh, Cookstown and perhaps Antrim);  
• some consensus in Belfast City Council, not only because of its political balance 
but also its dominance of what constitutes local government in Northern Ireland, 
would herald a major shift in unionists' attitudes to power sharing and act as an 
example for the waverers elsewhere.  
 
Second, can the model be extended to a Northern Ireland-wide power sharing forum? 
Based on the experiences of local government the "read -over" is not a simple one. A 
councillor made the point that it is much easier to share power when those powers are 
insignificant; the same would not be true in any new form of power sharing assembly:  
The council can work well on day-to-day issues where each party's constituents are faced 
with similar problems. We have no difficulty working with the SDLP or the UUP on 
roads and housing and a variety of different issues, but these powers do not reside with 
councils. If councils had real powers it would be harder to work with those parties. At the 
moment everybody can unite against the Housing Executive, Department of the 
Environment roads, planners etc the common enemy, but if the council had control over 
these services the debates would become sectarian. 52
Against that, however, is much evidence of good-will emerging between politicians at the 
local level, some of whom would see themselves as candidates in any province-wide 
forum. Moreover, the momentum is strong for political developments on the back of the 
long-awaited ceasefires. Future relationships will be fraught between the DUP and Sinn 
Fein, as is currently the case in local government. Indeed it is not certain whether the 
DUP would agree to participate in such a forum with Sinn Fein members. Yet there is a 
precedent for this at local government level where both parties recognize unbridgeable 
political positions but proceed with the council business. The lessons from local 
government are that whilst unionist controlled power sharing councils show signs of 
instability, evidence of co -operation is much more apparent than hitherto. This must 
provide qualified hope for those charged with devising a similar structure at the 
provincial level. The turn-around in councils from 1985 has been stark. At that time 
commissioners were called in to run some unionist controlled councils which refused to 
enact business as a protest against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Now there is evidence of 
much good-will and co-operation between the SDLP and UUP. This must provide some 
encouragement and direction for a power sharing forum at the macro level.  
 
The changing political milieu is creating conditions that are more conducive to 
accommodation in any new Northern Ireland-wide assembly. Evidence from this research 
has indicated a propensity for cross-party voting among the electorate even before the 
ceasefires. A more conciliatory approach is now evident and a huge amount of good-will 
exists among the population motivated by its desire never to return to violence. This 
bottom -up ground swell of public opinion is forcing political leaders to acknowledge and 
come to terms with positions which, previously, would have been untenable in the eyes of 
the electorate. UUP politicians engaging in debate with Sinn Fein, government ministers 
consulting political representatives of loyalist and republican paramilitaries, the active 
inclusion of Dublin's political leaders in talks about the future, are examples of a major 
shift in the political process which have met with public approval or acquiescence at the 
least. Alongside these constitutional developments the process has been copper-fastened 
by European money designed to simultaneously improve social and economic conditions 
in Northern Ireland. Between 1995-97, 416 million ECU will be provided "to promote the 
social inclusion of those who are at the margins of social and economic life and to exploit 
the opportunities and address the needs arising from the peace process." 53  
 
The local government model of power sharing may, therefore, successfully transplant to 
the provincial level where previous initiatives have failed. Three reasons give grounds for 
optimism. First, the context for transfer is one of peace, albeit fragile and still fraught 
with problems on constitutional progress, specifically the decommissioning of arms. 
Second, there is a bottom-up momentum for accommodation where previously, fixed 
positions were taken, the electorate were disillusioned and politicians responded with 
familiar rallying cries. Finally, there is a genuine acceptance by government (British, 
European and American) that constitutional developments in themselves are insufficient 
for a long-term settlement in Northern Ireland. A twin track approach whereby 
constitutional developments are juxtaposed with social and economic investment is now 
integral to the way forward. The local government experiment in power sharing has been 
a catalyst in the search for accommodation at the macro level and may well provide the 
model for a province-wide constitutional forum shared by unionists and nationalists.  
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